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Abstract
With the recent trend in crowdsourcing, i.e., using the power of crowds
to assist in satisfying demand, the pool of resources suitable for GeoPresen-
ce-capable systems has expanded to include already roaming devices, such
as mobile phones, and moving vehicles. We envision an environment, in
which the motion of these crowdsourced mobile resources is coordinated,
according to their preexisting schedules to satisfy geo-temporal demand on
a mobility field. In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route
coordination mechanism for crowdsourced resources, in which participat-
ing mobile agents satisfy geo-temporal requests in return for monetary
rewards. We define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) problem, in
which an agent’s flexibility is exploited to maximize the coverage of a mo-
bility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue collected from sat-
isfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-hard, we define
an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a single agent on a graph with
evolving labels, then we use that algorithm to define a 1
2
-approximation
algorithm to solve the problem in its general model, with multiple agents.
Moreover, we define an incentive compatible, rational, and cash-positive
payment mechanism, which guarantees that an agent’s truthfulness about
its flexibility is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy. Finally, we analyze
the proposed mechanisms theoretically, and evaluate their performance
experimentally using real mobility traces from urban environments.
1 Introduction
The continuing advances in mobile technology allow for the seamless integration
of applications and physical entities, creating GeoPresence-capable systems that
can transform the way people collect, analyze and use data. We refer to the
ability of an application to access physical devices under some geo-temporal
constraints as GeoPresence (GP) [4].
GP-capable systems have long existed in the form of dedicated infrastruc-
tures, in which mobile sensory devices are owned and controlled by an authority.
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In such infrastructure-based systems, such as sensor networks [2], robotic sys-
tems [11, 19], and dedicated vehicle systems [20, 7], the sole function of the sen-
sory mobile devices is to act as resources for satisfying geo-temporal demand,
such as sensory queries, and ride requests. These dedicated systems excel in
satisfying demand with high quality of service, but are costly to build, scale,
and maintain.
In a smart urban environment, humans are in control of technologically ad-
vanced mobile devices, such as phones and vehicles, which are no longer being
used for mere communication and transportation purposes, but can also be
used as mobile sensors and actuators. With the recent trend of crowdsourcing,
GP-capable systems no longer need to be built on dedicated infrastructures,
and participating self-motivated crowds already roaming in a mobility field can
be used to assist in satisfying geo-temporal demand. In such systems, crowd-
sourced resources are not owned by an authority, and their participation is op-
portunistic, and often unpredictable. Existing GP-capable systems that depend
on crowdsourced resources, such as in urban sensing systems [5], crowd-based
query answering systems [16], and Uber [28], usually act as brokers between
these crowdsourced resources (agents), and the geo-temporal demand for them.
The broker is not involved in the request allocation/assignment decision pro-
cess, and decisions are either made by the supply or the demand side, with the
broker acting as a facilitator of communication.
We envision an environment, in which the system does not own the mo-
bile resources, or have the ability to force them to follow predefined mobility
schedules, but rather acts as a broker that coordinates their mobility sched-
ules according to their mobility preferences and the existing demand. In our
proposed GeoPresence-as-a-Service (GPaaS) brokered model [4], on-demand
market-priced GeoPresence-based services are provided using the help of already
roaming crowdsourced agents, in which the broker acts as a proxy between ap-
plications with specific geo-temporal requests, and agents capable of servicing
these requests. The advantages of such a framework is that by employing the
help of the crowd, it provides the same sensory power of dedicated GP-capable
systems without the cost of setting up a physical infrastructure. Moreover,
the use of crowdsourced resources as part of the system allows for the devel-
opment of new smart services and applications that would have otherwise been
impossible. Examples of such applications are ubiquitous sensing, on-demand
advertisements, smart surveillance, real-time traffic guidance, on-demand health
care services, on-demand transportation and delivery, among many others.
In GPaaS, applications send in their geo-temporal requests with their cor-
responding payoff functions, and mobile agents to willingly participate in the
system by sharing their journey information, and their willingness to deviate
from their regular mobile paths, namely their flexibility. Agents have an enve-
lope of behaviors according their degree of flexibility, and they are assumed to
be under the disposal of the broker as long as the decisions made by the broker
are within that envelope, and they are rewarded for their services in satisfying
the geo-temporal requests. The mobile agents are presumed to be rational and
selfish, and that they would not deviate from their regular paths, i.e., offer to
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be flexible, unless given an incentive to do so.
Scope and Contribution.
In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route coordination mecha-
nism for crowdsourced resources, that can be incorporated as part of GPaaS,
specifically as an implementation of its resource allocation and payment services.
For resource allocation, we define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) prob-
lem, in which an agents flexibility is exploited to maximize their coverage on a
mobility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue of the system 1 col-
lected from satisfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-hard,
we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a single agent on a graph
with evolving labels, then we use that algorithm to define a 12 -approximation
algorithm to solve the problem in its general model, with multiple agents.
On the other hand, deciding on agents’ payment in such a crowdsourced
setting is another crucial challenge, as it has to be designed to not only reward
the agents for their participation and contribution to the revenue maximization
of the broker, but to also encourage them to report their maximum flexibility
in their mobile schedules. Formally, the payment mechanism used has to be
incentive compatible, i.e., guarantees that the agents’s best strategy is to report
their true maximum flexibility, and individually rational, i.e., guarantees that
it’s always rational for the agents to participate. Moreover, the payment model
has to be efficient, i.e., payments truly represent an agent’s contribution to the
system, and has to be cash-positive, i.e., the broker never pays out of pocket.
In this paper, we propose to give each agent a fair share of the revenue obtained
by the broker according to his contribution. Using the VCG economic model
[25], we define a metric that measures the true contribution of an agent to the
system’s revenue, which we then use to compute payments for participating
agents that guarantee their incentive compatibility and rationality.
In Section 2, we start by defining the Flexible Route Coordination prob-
lem, with its corresponding algorithms. In Section 3, we present a VCG-based
approach to compute the agents’ payments according to their contribution. In
Section 4, we experimentally evaluate the performance of both the route coordi-
nation, and payment mechanisms on real mobile traces in urban environments.
Finally, we present a short review of related work in Section 5, and conclude
the paper with a summary of our contributions, and present our future work.
2 Exploiting Agent Flexibility for Revenue
Maximization
We consider an offline model of allocation service in GPaaS, i,e, request and
agent information are completely known before the resource allocation is per-
formed. To enable such an offline process, we assume that the allocation service
runs on only the requests and agents available at the beginning of an epoch. We
1We use the terms system and broker interchangeably in this paper, as they both represent
the central authority coordinating the resources and satisfying demand.
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define an epoch as a sequence of discrete time steps, in which the properties
of the mobility field, the requests and the agents don’t change. Requests and
agents may reappear in multiple epochs, given that their temporal properties
correspond to that epoch.
In this section, we define the Flexible Route Coordination problem as a
model of resource allocation in GPaaS. We define an optimal routing algorithm
for the problem with a single agent, and prove that it’s NP-hard to solve with
multiple agents. Finally, we use the single-agent algorithm proposed to define a
greedy 12 -approximation algorithm for the general problem model with multiple
agents.
2.1 Demand and Resource Specification
We model the structure of the mobility field, i.e., map of city or locale, as a graph
G = (V,E) in which the set of vertices V represents the various landmarks in
the field, and the set of edges E represents the links between these landmarks.
Movement between landmarks, i.e along an edge, is done in a single discrete
time step, and the graph properties do not change through time.
An agent is defined by its journey, and is represented as (v0, t0, vd, td), in
which the agent’s start location, and earliest time of departure are represented
by v0 and t0 respectively, and its destination location, and latest time of arrival
are represented by vd and td respectively. An agent’s incurred cost for traversing
a path on the graph G is 0, as long as it departs from the start location after the
earliest departure time, and arrives at the destination before its corresponding
latest time of arrival, and is ∞ otherwise.
A request in R is defined by its geo-temporal properties, and payoff function,
(v¯, t¯, val(t¯′)), in which the location vi ∈ V is the ith desired location of the
request, and ti is the corresponding time for visiting that location. The payoff
function, val(t¯′), represents the valuation of servicing the request at different
times, and is usually defined to be maximum at the desired locations, v¯, and
corresponding times, t¯.
2.2 Route Coordination to Maximize Revenue
We aim to maximize the revenue achieved from satisfying geo-temporal requests,
by exploiting agents’ flexibility to increase coverage. Formally, we define an
agent’s flexibility as a measure of its tolerance of delay, and it’s the difference
between its specified latest time of arrival at a destination, and its earliest time
of arrival, i.e., when shortest path is used. This flexibility generates an envelope
of different-length feasible paths, all of which fulfill the agent’s journey, with
negligible cost incurred by the agent.
Problem Definition. Given the mobility field graph G, a list of requests
R, and a list of agents A as defined above, the Flexible Route Coordination
(FRC ) problem is that of finding a feasible path for each agent in the list A
that maximizes the revenue of the system. The revenue of the system is defined
as the total payoff obtained from the satisfied requests as defined by their payoff
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functions, and according to the actual times of their satisfaction. Moreover, a
feasible path has to fulfill the journey constraints as defined by the agent, i.e.,
start at its desired start location, v0, at a time no earlier than t0, and arrive at
the destination, vd, at a time no later than td.
2.2.1 FRC with a Single Agent
Given a single agent, we define an exact polynomial-time algorithm, namely
the Flex-Routing algorithm, to find the optimal path to be traversed by that
agent, which fulfills the agent’s journey and maximizes the system’s revenue.
The algorithm is inspired by dynamic source routing mechanisms adopted in
ad-hoc networks [14], in which the graph nodes forward path information to
their neighbors over multiple rounds in an attempt to find the optimal path,
with some maximum length, from a source node to a destination node.
The Flex-Routing Algorithm.
Given an instance of the FRC problem with a single agent, (G, a = (v0, t0, vd,
td), R), we use the information in R to create a temporal graph G
R, which is
basically a copy of G = (V,E), with node labels that vary according to the time
step in {t0, ..., td}. GR is created by storing the information of the requests
payoff functions directly on the graph nodes corresponding to their specified
locations. The graph GR = (N,E) is composed of a set of specially labeled
nodes, each of which correspond to a vertex in the original graph G, and a set
of edges equivalent to those in G. Each node in the graph is labeled with the
payoff details of requests in the form of a set of 3-tuples of (r, t, val), which
represent the request’s valuation, val, of being satisfied at time step t.
Finding the optimal route for the agent a on G is equivalent to finding the
maximum revenue path on GR for a packet originating from v0 at t0 to be sent
to the destination vd before the end of its lifetime at td. Route information
is encoded in path records, which are passed on from nodes to their neighbors
every time step between t0 and td. A path record contains information about
the geo-temporal properties of a path, in addition to the requests satisfied on it,
and the payoff obtained from each request according to the time it was satisfied.
As shown in Alg. 1, the Flex-Routing algorithm runs in a sequence of rounds.
In each round, the path records corresponding to each node are updated accord-
ing to the node’s payoff labels. A path record is updated if an already satisfied
request on the path can be satisfied with a higher payoff, or if a new request can
be satisfied. Then, for each node, the path record with the highest revenue is
compared to the maximum-revenue path record ever received by that node. If
the recently updated record provides an improved revenue, then it becomes the
new maximum-revenue record, and is copied to the record list of all neighboring
nodes, including itself.
To find the optimal route for an agent, a = (v0, t0, vd, td), we start by creating
an initial path record for the node corresponding to v0 at t0. The revenue of
the record is computed according to the node’s payoff labels, and is forwarded
to all neighboring nodes as well as the node representing v0 itself. Then, d
rounds of the algorithm are executed, with path records updated and forwarded
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Algorithm 1 The optimal Flex-Routing algorithm for finding the maximum
revenue path on a temporal graph.
1: Input: (G = (V,E), a = (v0, t0, vd, td), R)
2: Create GR
3: Create empty lists PR[|V |] and Best[|V |]
4: Create path record (rev(n0, t0)
5: Add record to all PR[i] : (0, vi) ∈ E
6: for t = t1 : td do
7: for i : 0→ |V | do
8: for r in PR[i] do
9: if rev(ni, t) > rev(r) then
10: Update the record
11: Get maximum record r∗
12: if rev(r∗) > Best[i] then
13: Add record to all PR[j] : (vi, vj) ∈ E
14: Output: Best[vd]
in each round. Finally, at td, the maximum-revenue path record at the node
corresponding to the destination vd is chosen as the final decision of the routing
algorithm.
Analysis.
For a journey of duration d time units, on a graph with |V | nodes, the
Flex-Routing algorithm runs in d rounds. Within each round, each node goes
through at most |V | route records to update, and finally sends at most a single
record to its neighbors (at most the |V |). Thus, the Flex-Routing algorithm is
polynomial, and terminates in O(d.|V |2) steps.
To prove that the Flex-Routing algorithm optimally solves the FRC problem
with a single agent optimally, we start by proving that it does indeed find the
optimal path of length d between a pair of source and destination nodes on the
temporal graph GR.
Lemma 1 At the end of each round in the Flex-Routing algorithm, the route
record forwarded by a node always represents the local optimal path, of duration
equal to the round index, from the source node to that node.
Proof. At each round ti in the Flex-Routing algorithm, each node has a list
of route records for routes with a duration of i time units. Since a node only
forwards a route record if the route has the highest revenue observed at the node
so far, we guarantee that the route in that record is indeed the optimal route
of duration i time units from the source node to that node. Also, since nodes
forward the route records to themselves as well, we guarantee that waiting at
the nodes is allowed, if it achieves a higher revenue.
Theorem 1 The Flex-Routing algorithm always computes the optimal path on
a temporal graph.
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Proof. Since the algorithm is executed on the graph GR, on which only
positive payoff functions between t0, and td are recorded, and since the initial
route record is created at time t0, and execution ends at td, we guarantee that
the route chosen by the algorithm always satisfies the agent’s journey.
Moreover, following Lemma 1, we guarantee that in the final round of Flex-
Routing , the algorithm will produce the optimal paths of lengths d from the
source node to every other node, including the destination. Thus, the local
optimal route record stored at the destination vertex at round td represents the
optimal path according to the agent’s journey, and the requests in the system.
Since the revenues encoded on the nodes in GR are obtained from the set
of geo-temporal requests R, and since the optimality of a path in the Flex-
Routing algorithm is defined as the total maximum revenue from visiting the
nodes. Moreover, since the Flex-Routing algorithm is defined in a way that
only considers the revenue of visiting a request on a node at most once, we
guarantee that the path found by the algorithm is equivalent to the optimal
path as defined in the FRC problem.
2.2.2 FRC with Multiple Agents
In the general case of allocation, with multiple agents, the allocation algorithm
uses the information provided by the n agents, to decide on an outcome, i.e., a
set of feasible paths for the agents, that maximizes the revenue of the system.
We define an agent’s welfare, wi(R), as the maximum revenue the agent is
able to collect from a set of requests R according to its journey constraints,
which can be computed optimally using the Flex-Routing algorithm above. By
this definition of an agent’s welfare, maximizing the revenue of the system can
be achieved by maximizing the sum of the individual agents’ welfare. Formally,
Given a set of requests, R, with predefined payoff functions, and a set of n agents
with predefined journeys over a mobility graph, we can maximize the system’s
revenue by partitioning the requests into mutually exclusive subsets, R1, ..., Rn,
and assigning them to the n agents such that
∑n
i=1 wi(Ri) is maximized.
Lemma 2 An agent’s welfare function, as computed by the optimal Flex-Routing
algorithm, is submodular.
Proof. On the set of requests, R, a submodular function is a set function
f : 2R → R, where 2R denotes the power set of R, if for every X ⊆ Y ⊆ R, and
∀r ∈ R\Y , we have that f(X∪{r})−f(X) ≥ f(Y ∪{r})−f(Y ) [10]. Given our
definition of the agent’s welfare function, f(X) represents the revenue achieved
by the agent when attempting to satisfy the requests in X, and similarly for Y .
Since X ⊆ Y , it results in one of two options; either the path chosen to satisfy
Y has a longer duration for an increased revenue, or it’s exactly as long as that
chosen for X for the same revenue.
Assuming the two paths have the same duration, adding a new request r to
either of them would have the same exact effect, leading to equivalent values of
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f(X ∪ {r}) − f(X), and f(Y ∪ {r}) − f(Y ). On the other hand, if the path
chosen for f(Y ) was longer and the request r is added to it, the payoff received
from satisfying the request will never be more than its payoff when satisfied
with the smaller subset of the path, because that request can never be reached
at a better time to achieve a higher payoff in the longer path. Thus, it always
happens that f(X ∪ {r})− f(X) ≥ f(Y ∪ {r})− f(Y ).
Theorem 2 The FRC problem with multiple agents is NP-hard.
Proof. According to Lemma 2, an agent’s welfare function is a submodular
function, resulting in our problem being equivalent to that of the submodular
welfare maximization problem [29], which is known to be NP-hard.
The Greedy-FRC Algorithm.
The Greedy-FRC algorithm is a greedy heuristic, which aims to find the
set of mutually exclusive subsets R1, ..., Rn to be assigned to each agent, such
that R1 ∪ ... ∪ Rn = R, and the total welfare of the agents is maximized.
In the Greedy-FRC algorithm, requests are initially sorted according to their
maximum payoff, then each requests is assigned to the agent that can achieve
the highest marginal increase in its welfare by satisfying the request as part of
its journey. Once a request is assigned to an agent, it cannot be removed, but
can be satisfied for a lower payoff if the agent had to change its path to satisfy
another request, and maximize its overall welfare.
Algorithm 2 The greedy Greedy-FRC approximation algorithm.
1: Input: A, R, G
2: Create empty lists Result[n], Welfare[n], x[n]
3: Sort R by max payoff
4: for each rj in R do
5: for each ai in A do
6: x[i] = Flex-Routing (G, ai, Result[i] ∪ rj)
7: Find ai with maximum (x[i]−Welfare[i])
8: Result[i] = Result[i] ∪ rj
9: Welfare[i] = x[i]
10: Output: R[1], ..., R[n]
Theorem 3 The Greedy-FRC algorithm is a 12 -approximation algorithm.
Proof. Given that it has been proven in [24, 29] that a greedy algorithm as de-
scribed aboce provides a 12 -approximation for the submodular welfare maximiza-
tion problem, it follows that our proposed greedy algorithm is a 12 -approximation
as well.
3 Incentive Compatible Payments
The key of maximizing the system’s revenue according to the FRC problem is
to exploit the agents’ reported flexibility, i.e., use their tolerance of delay to
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cover the graph at different times, satisfying the available requests. Increased
agent flexibility increases the system’s revenue, but also increases the agent’s
inconvenience. Since an agent’s true flexibility is private to the agent, a rational
agent might report less flexibility untruthfully, if it increases its own utility
2. Therefore, we propose using mechanism design principles, specifically the
intuition behind the Clarke-Pivot rule used in VCG mechanisms [25], to give
the agents an incentive to reveal their private information truthfully to the
broker, i.e., the decision maker, and avoid strategic signaling.
In GPaaS, agents report their flexibility values as a part of their journey
information at the beginning of an epoch, and cannot change them during the
allocation, i.e., route coordination, process. Formally, we say that each agent i
has a privately known type θi that corresponds to that agent’s private flexibility
value, and we denote by Θi the space of all of agent i’s possible types. An agent’s
preference of a certain outcome is defined by its utility function, ui : Θi×O → <,
where ui(θi, o) represents the agent’s utility for outcome o ∈ O when the agent
has type θi ∈ Θi. An agent’s utility function is publicly known by all other
agents, but the exact utility of an agent for an outcome is only privately known
by the agent as it depends on its type.
3.1 Valuations and Utilities
Given a set of agents A and a set of requests R, let the outcome o ∈ O be
the outcome of an allocation decision. This outcome is in the form of subsets of
requests allocated to each agentR1, ..., Rn, which represents the optimal solution
of the FRC problem with inputs R and A : |A| = n. An agent i’s valuation
of an outcome is defined as the maximum revenue that can be achieved by the
agent from being assigned its corresponding subset of requests according to its
reported flexibility value, i.e., its welfare. Given a subset of requests Ri, the
welfare of an agent can be computed optimally using the Flex-Routing algorithm
defined in 2.2.1.
vi(θ
′
i, o = R1, ..., Rn) = wi(Ri) (1)
To measure an agent’s effect on the total revenue achieved by the broker,
we define a measure of its degree of contribution to the system, namely the
redundancy score. An agent’s redundancy score is derived from the Clarke-
Pivot rule, and is defined as the difference between the maximum social welfare
of the system from an allocation not including the agent, and the maximum
social welfare of the other agents from an allocation including the agent.
RSi =
∑
j 6=i
vj(θ
′
j , o−i)−
∑
j 6=i
vj(θ
′
j , o) (2)
In which o is the outcome of an allocation decision made with all agents,
and o−i is the outcome of an allocation decision made without the agent. A
2In our model, we assume that agents will never report a higher flexibility than their true
maximum flexibility, since higher flexibility always puts them at a disadvantage
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higher score indicates that more of the revenue achieved by the agent can be
covered by the other agents, which indicates the agent’s weaker contribution to
the system.
Finally, we define an agent’s utility of an outcome ui : Θi × O → < as
the difference between its welfare from the outcome, given its true maximum
flexibility value, and its redundancy score.
ui(θi, o) = vi(θi, o)−RSi (3)
3.2 Payment and Truthfulness
Since the agents’ true flexibility values affect allocation decisions, and are only
privately known by them, we propose to share the revenue achieved by the
broker with all agents participating in satisfying demand according to their
contribution to that revenue. For each agent participating in satisfying requests,
and contributing with some revenue to the broker, it’s paid a portion of its
achieved revenue according to the following.
pi(θ
′i, o) = vi(θ′i, o)−RSi (4)
The intuition behind this payment function is that it’s maximized as the
agent’s redundancy score decreases, and valuation out of an allocation outcome
based on its reported flexibility value increases.
Theorem 4 The payment model is incentive compatible, individually rational,
efficient, and cash-positive.
Proof.
Incentive Compatibility.
An agent i can increase his utility by reporting an untruthful flexibility value θ′i
to either increase his valuation of an outcome based on its reported flexibility
value, or to decrease his redundancy score. Since an agent’s valuation is defined
as his welfare from an outcome, the only way an agent can increase his valuation
is by reporting a higher flexibility value, which is not possible because a higher
flexibility valuation that the truthful one is not feasible and not in Θi.
As for lying to affect the value of the redundancy score, the score is defined
using the Clarke pivot rule, which makes it non-vulnerable to manipulation by
an agent, since it does not depend in any way on the agent’s reported flexibility
valuation.
Individual Rationality.
Since the outcome produced by the allocation decision algorithm represents the
optimal allocation given the agent’s reported values, we can always guaran-
tee that an agent’s redundancy score is never larger than the agent’s welfare.
Therefore, the agent’s utility is always greater than or equal to zero.
Efficiency
Since the payment function computes payments considers both the agent’s re-
dundancy score, and his valuation of the reported outcome, we guarantee that
the payment model is efficient.
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Cash-positivity.
The outcome produced by the allocation decision algorithm represents the op-
timal allocation given the agent’s reported values. Therefore, we can always
guarantee that when an agent is removed from the allocation decision, the so-
cial welfare of the other agents is never worse that when the agent is considered
for allocation. Therefore, the redundancy score is never negative, its payment is
never more that the revenue it achieves, and the system never faces a negative
utility.
Discussion. We note that our proposed payment model guarantees truth-
fulness as an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy, since an agent’s utility depends
on the reported valuations of the other agents, as well as the outcome of the
allocation decision. Although this payment model has all the advantages of
being efficient, incentive compatible, rational, cash-positive, and computation-
ally inexpensive, we are still working on developing it further to provide profit
guarantees for the broker. Moreover, VCG-based mechanisms are vulnerable
to collusions, and monopoly situations, which might occur in a real scenario if
multiple agents are controlled by the same entity.
4 Performance Evaluation
The purpose of the evaluations is to analyze the mechanism’s allocation and
payment models under different model instantiations. In this section, we present
our simulation setting and evaluation results.
4.1 Simulation Setting
To generate a diverse set of instantiations from the FRC problem model, we
develop our own simulator, which emulates the mobility field settings, as well as
the agents and the request on the field. The graph representing the mobility is
of a grid topology, in which the nodes represents GPS coordinates of the city of
San Francisco in the form of longitude and latitude values. Requests and agents
information are generated at the beginning of each epoch, and all simulations
are performed with complete knowledge, in which the set of generated agents
and requests are processed as batches in an offline manner.
Request Model.
Requests are created with randomly chosen locations, distributed uniformly over
the mobility field, and with temporal demand that is generated according to an
exponential distribution with a mean that is a parameter of the simulation.
All requests can share their allocated agents with other requests, and have
homogeneous types of sensory demands, but each request has to be satisfied by
a single agent. Moreover, all requests have the same payment functions, which
is defined as a linearly decreasing function in both directions of time, i,e, the
maximum payoff of a request is achieved if it’s satisfied at its defined time, and
that payoff decreases by a single unit for every time step for being satisfied
earlier or later. In the experiments below, we set the mean temporal rate of
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requests to be 1/10 of a time unit, and all requests have a maximum valuation
of 50.
Agent Model.
In our evaluations, we apply two models for generating agents on the mobility
field. In the first model, which we use to evaluate the behavior of our mech-
anisms in a perfectly independent setting, we generate agents with randomly
chosen locations, distributed uniformly over the mobility field, and with tem-
poral demand that is generated according to an exponential distribution with
a mean that is a parameter of the simulation. In the second model, agent’s
journeys are generated from cab mobility traces in San Francisco, USA [26],
which we use to define a journey’s start location, destination location, and the
expected duration of the journey. An agent’s flexibility is defined as a fraction
of its expected journey duration, i.e., a flexibility factor of 0 indicates that the
agent has to fulfill its journey in minimum time, and a flexibility factor of 1
indicates that the agent has a tolerance for delay as originally recorded in the
traces. As for the start time of an agent’s journey, we assume that journeys’
inter-start times follow an exponential distribution, and we generate these start
times accordingly.
Performance metrics.
In each simulation, we evaluate the system’s achieved revenue, payment, partic-
ipation rate, and per-agent benefit ratio. The system’s achieved revenue is the
total payoff collected from satisfied requests, its payment is the summation of
payments made to all agents satisfying requests, and the participation rate is the
ratio between agents generating revenue, and the total number of participating
agents. An agent’s benefit is the ratio between the payment an agent receives,
and the revenue it achieves.
4.2 Experiments and Results
4.2.1 Behavior with Synthesized Agents
To evaluate the effect of agents’ density, i.e., the number of available agents
per unit time, and agent’s flexibility on the revenue obtained from satisfied
requests in a perfect setting with independent agents, we create journeys that
are distributed uniformly over the mobility field. The results in Fig. 1 represent
the increase in revenue as we vary the agents’ true flexibility value. The slow
increase in revenue for higher flexibility exemplifies the effect of the journey
constraints, the start and destination locations, on the ability of agents to reach
far requests.
On the other hand, as a new agent is added to the mobility field at a ran-
dom location, it adds a new coverage area. Thus, increasing the possibility of
satisfying more requests, and increasing revenue. In Fig. 2, we can see that the
marginal increase of revenue caries according to the degree of flexibility of the
agents, which is indicative of the effect of the agent’s flexibility on the size of
his coverage area.
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Figure 1: When agents are randomly distributed over the mobility field, the
marginal utility of increasing flexibility is low, due to original journey con-
straints.
13
Figure 2: When agents are randomly distributed over the mobility field, every
extra agent considered for allocation increases the area of coverage, leading to
higher revenue. Moreover, the size of the newly covered area depends on the
agents flexibility values.
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Figure 3: An increased distribution of agents over the mobility field leads to
higher revenue, but the marginal increase of revenue with increased flexibility
always decreases for higher flexibility values.
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4.2.2 Behavior with Real Traces
In the next set of experiments, we evaluate the performance of the mechanism
with real traces from an urban environment, in which agents’ journeys are usu-
ally not independent, as they are denser in more populated areas. In most of the
experiments below, we set the agent density to be 5, unless otherwise notified.
We start by evaluating the performance of the allocation and payment mech-
anisms with agents with different degrees of randomization (R), i.e., randomized
distribution over the mobility field. In Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, we represent the rev-
enue, profit, and agent benefit of the allocation as the flexibility increases, for
different degrees of randomization.
In urban environments, agents tend to have increased locality, i.e., their
journeys are denser in certain areas of the mobility field. In terms of revenue,
this leads to decreased revenue since the coverage areas of the agents overlap.
However, this overlap of coverage areas lead to an increased redundancy score
for agents, which leads to lower payments to them, and higher profit to the
broker.
For the next set of experiments, we compare the revenue obtained from
the Greedy-FRC algorithm to that of an multi-stage single item auction-based
algorithm (HG*) that we proposed in [4]. In a single stage of the HG* algorithm,
agents bid over single requests, and the agent with the highest bid on a request
is assigned that request. After requests are assigned to the highest bidding
agents, the auction is repeated with the leftover requests, and the agents with
their updated journeys. Moreover, we compare our payment mechanism to a
second-priced payment model that could be adopted in each single-item auction
stage in HG* 3. As shown in Fig. 5, the profit of using second-priced auctions is
always zero, since it’s not an efficient method to distribute payments to agents,
and the revenue obtained from the Greedy-FRC algorithm is never worse than
HG*.
In Fig. 3a, we noticed that the system’s profit spikes at flexibility value of
1 for the set of agents with no randomization, R = 0, and density of 5. Also,
in Fig.4d, with no randomization and agent density of 7, the profit spikes at
flexibility value of 0.8. To further investigate this behavior, we performed a
couple more experiments using the set of journeys as obtained from the real
traces, and measured the agents participation rate.
In Fig. 6, with agent density of 5, we present the relationship between the
revenue achieved, and the profit made in the system, and the agents participa-
tion rate. We notice that due to the increased locality of the agents, increasing
flexibility results in an increased revenue, and a corresponding increase in profit.
Until a certain congestion point is reached, in which increasing the agents flexi-
bility doesn’t enable them to satisfy new demand, but rather affects them nega-
tively by increasing their redundancy score. This negative effect on the agents is
3Given that the second-priced auction payment mode is not incentive compatible, we use
the true flexibility valuations to compare the payments mechanisms.
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a: Profit obtained from allocation with an agent density of 2.
b: Agent benefit obtained from allocation with an agent density of 7.
Figure 4: An increased distribution of agents over the mobility field reduced the
systems profit, but increases the individual agent benefit. Since agents are more
distributed over the mobility field, they have lower redundancy scores, and get
paid back most of the revenue that they achieve.
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c: Revenue obtained from allocation with an agent density of 2.
d: Revenue obtained from allocation with an agent density of 7.
Figure 5: Comparing the Greedy-FRC algorithm to the multi-stage auction al-
location algorithm, HG*, the revenue obtained by Greedy-FRC is always higher.
Moreover, second-priced payments always lead to no profit for the broker.
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Figure 6: The agents’ locality affects their participation rate as their flexibil-
ity increases, which in turn affects their payments and the broker’s profit. A
decrease in agent participation is due to their concentration in the city’s cen-
tral area, which increases their individual redundancy scores as their flexibility
increases.
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Figure 7: At different agent density values, the participation rate decreases at
varying flexibility values. This decrease occurs at critical congestion points, in
which agents’ coverage areas overlap, increasing their redundancy scores, which
are directly followed by increased participation as flexibility increases.
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translated into a higher profit for the broker, which eventually decreases again
as agents flexibility increases, and they are able to expand their coverage ar-
eas and satisfy new requests. Similarly, in Fig. 7, we note the spikes in profit
at various flexibility values, accompanied with a decrease in participation rate,
followed by a decrease in profit.
5 Related Work
Route Coordination.
Existing GeoPresence-capable systems can be categorized as either infrastructure-
based, or crowdsourced. In infrastructure-based systems, agents are owned by
an entity, and their actions are controlled to optimize the system’s objective. In
such systems, agents can be stationary, as in traditional wireless sensor networks
[18]. Alternatively, agents can be mobile, as in robotics [30, 11] and dedicated
vehicular systems [20, 7], with their journeys decided according to the system’s
constraints. Mobility control is widely used for field coverage [13], maintenance
of communication chains [9] or for specific task accomplishment [23].
In crowdsourced GeoPresence-capable systems, agents are self-motivated,
with predefined schedules and uncontrolled mobility patterns. They willingly
participate in the system and decide whether or not to perform a task. i.e., ser-
vice a request, according to their prior plans, and they may alter their schedules
to perform a task if given the right incentive to do so. In existing crowdsourced
systems, the request satisfaction decision is performed solely by the agents, and
the system cannot dictate and/or predict their behavior. Examples of these sys-
tems include enterprise-based crowdsourcing applications as Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk [3] and Uber [28], and opportunistic sensor networks as in [1, 31]. The
spatio-temporal request satisfaction process in such systems is opportunistic,
ad-hoc, and provides no quality-of-service guarantees.
Our proposed model lies under the crowdsourced systems category, with
an assumption that the self-motivated agents allow for coordinated mobility
patterns, which was first proposed in [22], according to our knowledge.
Economical Models for Resource Allocation.
Economical models have long been incorporated in the resource allocation pro-
cess in distributed systems, in which resources are allocated to the demand using
models such as auctions, commodity markets, coalitions, and combinatorial auc-
tions. In systems with controlled mobile agents, auction-based approaches have
commonly been used to allow the agents to bid for satisfying the demand that
maximizes their utility, as in [6, 19, 8], or to allow customers to bid for cheaper,
or more customized, resources [21, 17]. Although these approaches seem success-
ful in such settings, they are not suitable for deciding on incentive compatible
payments in highly combinatorial optimization problems, in which the agents’
themselves are crowdsourced, and contribute in the system’s revenue.
In current systems with crowdsourced agents, prices are either posted such
as in Amazon Mechanical Turk [3], or follow a commodity market model, as
in Uber [28]. Recently, mechanisms for pricing tasks in crowdsourced systems
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have been proposed, such as bargaining mechanisms between customers and
agents [12], and incentive compatible mechanisms that minimizes the customers
cost under a budget [15, 27]. However, our mechanism model differs than these
approaches due to the geo-temporal properties of both the resources and the
demand.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed a novel incentive compatible route coordination
mechanism for mobile crowdsourced resourced, which manages to maximize the
revenue of the system, with a guarantee that truthfulness is an ex-post Nash
equilibrium strategy. Our approach can be implemented as part of our pro-
posed GPaaS brokered model for satisfying geo-temporal demand, or it can
be used as a stand alone route coordination mechanism on graphs with posi-
tive node attributes. The mechanism is composed of two components; (1) A
1
2 -approximation allocation algorithm for resources and demand with specific
geo-temporal constraints, and (2) A VCG-based payment model that guaran-
tees the truthfulness and rationality of the participating agents. Moreover, we
presented evaluation results that support our theoretical analysis, and evaluate
the mechanism’s performance on traces from urban settings.
Our future work is in two directions; (1) The development of route coordina-
tion mechanisms that would allow for fault-tolerant resource allocation, and the
development of online allocation and payment mechanisms, which can provide
theoretical guarantees even with uncertain demand and agent behavior, and
(2) The implementation of the different services of the GPaaS brokered model,
including the resource allocation and payment components, which we have pre-
sented in this paper, as well as the application and agent interfaces, and the
quality control and the data analytic services.
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